A year has passed since the July mass uprising. Within this time, the current interim government has also completed a year in office. An election timeline has been announced.
At this moment, we are recalling the memories of the mass uprising, calculating expectations and achievements. Discussions are ongoing about the successes and failures of the interim government.
But a lot has changed than that which meets the eye.
A year into the uprising, the same July that united so many, is now being called by some to be a "hijacked revolution".
Others are saying a constitutional counterrevolution has taken place. Many have expressed multidimensional concerns due to mob violence, the rise of right-wing forces, and various interventions by imperialist and hegemonic powers.
Again there are some who see the dialogue and consensus among political parties on some reforms to the state's superstructure as a positive development.
Political parties are fighting among themselves over their share of the mass uprising's legacy.
It seems that various political groups, the civil-military bureaucracy, and different domestic and foreign interest groups are now actively crafting their own versions of the July narrative to secure their share of future power. This is where the question of counterrevolution or a hijacked revolution arises.
Meanwhile, the ousted autocrat is trying to regain political relevance.
Amid all this noise, the main question is perhaps lost: after so much bloodshed and sacrifice in the mass uprising, has it been possible to advance the task of Bangladesh's democratic transformation?
It is true that during last year's July awakening, people did not take to the streets under any single manifesto. People of different political ideologies had diverse latent aspirations regarding state governance, but the immediate goal was the fall of authoritarian rule.
There was no revolutionary program or concrete political agenda in front of the people.
The short-term goal with which people took to the streets was achieved through the fall of the authoritarian fascist ruler.
Even after the fall of the autocrat, people took to the streets without any clear plan on what would happen when it came to the question of power.
In that sense, people, without relying on any political force, became active agents themselves and achieved their immediate objective.
Those who joined the movement did so with a clear purpose, not by mistake; to join meant to accelerate the fall of the authoritarian ruler.
There was no doubt about that among the protesting students and masses. But after the ruler's fall, there also seemed to be no predetermined consensus among the protesting students, political parties, and other social stakeholders on who would come to power, by what process, and in which direction Bangladesh would move forward.
Democracy is not just the rule of the majority — it also means ensuring the presence of marginalised voices in state governance. Therefore, the question of eliminating ethnic, religious, gender, and class-based discrimination, at least in the area of citizens' rights, is inextricably linked to building a democratic state.
Even after a year, such consensus has largely not been formed.
Democracy is not just the rule of the majority — it also means ensuring the presence of marginalised voices in state governance.
Broadly speaking, within the masses — especially students and young people — the desire to build a democratic state from an anti-discrimination standpoint had been expressed, which we saw reflected in various slogans and graffiti.
While political groups all more or less acknowledged this aspiration for a discrimination-free, democratic state, there were stark differences over what such a state would look like.
Some differences are so extreme that there is no immediate solution.
Having differences is not unusual — such diversity of opinion is desirable in a democratic society. But the crisis now is that, in addressing the questions of democratising the state, the people are no longer able to remain in the role of active agents of change.
It seems that various political groups, the civil-military bureaucracy, and different domestic and foreign interest groups are now actively crafting their own versions of the July narrative to secure their share of future power. This is where the question of counterrevolution or a hijacked revolution arises.
For those who overthrew the autocrat, are their aspirations or intentions being reflected in the post-uprising democratic transformation of the state?
Although our politics presents various opinions and narratives, it can be said that according to the aspirations of the masses who participated in the Great Liberation War and later democratic struggles, no government to date has truly governed the country in a democratic way — or been able to.
In Bangladesh, we have seen various types of governments: elected, unelected, fraudulently "elected," army-backed, direct military rule, presidential, and prime ministerial.
Even though there are doubts about the future of political parties' mutual discussions on reforming the governance system after July, the fact that some discussions on state governance are appearing before the public can be seen as a positive development.
Our Constitution has also been amended many times — sometimes through ordinances, sometimes through the two-thirds majority of "elected" parliament members. But there is considerable doubt as to whether these amendments truly reflect the opinions, aspirations, or intentions of the people.
Even in the so-called referendums, the results clearly did not reflect everyone's true opinions. For many, due to being deprived of voting rights for so long, the right to vote itself has become synonymous with democracy.
The ability to exercise the right to vote is, of course, the minimum condition for democracy. This minimum right must be ensured, but it should not be forgotten that electing representatives through voting is not the final word in democracy.
A winning political party in a relatively "good election" can still govern the state undemocratically — and has done so. Based on these experiences, we need to ask how far we have progressed in the process of democratic transformation of the state after July.
Democracy is not just the rule of the majority — it also means ensuring the presence of marginalised voices in state governance.
Therefore, the question of eliminating ethnic, religious, gender, and class-based discrimination, at least in citizens' rights, is inextricably linked to building a democratic state.
To ensure these rights, it is not enough to simply build democratic state institutions; affirmative action must also be taken to eliminate discrimination and ensure representation of marginalised voices. Without bringing this question to the forefront, no matter how much the Constitution is amended, no matter how much consensus is built on superstructural governance issues, and no matter what principles are written in the Constitution, it will not be possible to make the state democratic.
Due to the inevitable effects of long-standing undemocratic rule, nationalist and discriminatory narratives have taken root in society.
While the state will not directly create alternative narratives, it does have the responsibility to create a favourable environment for the growth of anti-discrimination narratives when they emerge from within society.
Yet, even after July, we saw the state take no action against attempts — often backed by physical force — to suppress marginalised voices in support of nationalist and discriminatory narratives.
Rather, many of those we now see as stakeholders in the current government have themselves tried to suppress marginalised communities through undemocratic means. When mob violence was carried out in various places, shrines were destroyed, attacks were made on the basis of religious and ethnic identity, women were assaulted, and moral policing occurred — in all these cases, the post-July government's failure and, in some cases, indifference was glaringly disappointing.
Despite this, the question of "reform" of the state has repeatedly surfaced over the past year.
Since the July mass uprising was not a social revolution of united people based on a specific program, a complete transformation of the socio-economic system is not possible in this situation — any rational person would understand this.
But the democratic reforms necessary in people's everyday lives for the minimum democratic transformation of the state have, in most cases, remained completely unmentioned.
No Education Reform Commission has been formed. The question of what kind of investment the state should make in education and how to build an education system suitable for constructing a democratic state has been ignored.
The issue of how marginalised people can access quality healthcare has not come to the fore in discussions on health system reform.
If we interpret the term "new arrangement" as the democratic transformation of the state, then we still have a long way to go to make that struggle victorious.
This interim government may not be able to complete that task; it is not even possible to expect it from them.
Meanwhile, we still have not heard political parties' views on ensuring the minimum rights and wages of working people, guaranteeing employment for the wider population, implementing farmer-friendly reforms in agriculture, and building a self-reliant economy in the national interest to counter the economic dominance and bullying of powerful states in the current global order.
We have not brought to the forefront the discussion of whether the democratic transformation of the state is possible while leaving these issues unaddressed.
When a large section of the population is economically and socially disadvantaged, when the state cannot guarantee the civil and fundamental rights of the wider population, when their lives and livelihoods are insecure, and when the state cannot create even the minimum opportunity for the development of all communities — how can democratic transformation of the state be achieved by making only some superstructural reforms?
The interim government will not be able to answer these questions, nor does it have the opportunity to do so. But the fact that these questions have largely remained unmentioned in the democratic transformation of the state is a conversation we have not seen raised strongly — not from political parties, nor even from those engaged in intellectual activity.
If someone expects that the people will automatically become "agents" and exercise their "structural power" to shape the state according to their intentions or aspirations — while keeping existing social and state inequalities intact or without bringing forward a program to eliminate them — then the question remains: how realistic is that expectation?
A revolution or uprising that would fundamentally change the old system into a truly "new arrangement" in Bangladesh has not occurred. To achieve that, active public support and organised effort in a program-based movement is necessary.
If we interpret the term "new arrangement" as the democratic transformation of the state, then we still have a long way to go to make that struggle victorious. This interim government may not be able to complete that task; it is not even possible to expect it from them.
Signs indicate that this government will build some consensus on certain superstructural reforms and then hold elections. If, in this phase, we can at least succeed in restoring voting rights and some minimum democratic processes in the state, then on that foundation, it is necessary to bring forward a genuine "anti-discrimination" program from now on for a true democratic transformation.
To implement such a program for democratic transformation, we will still have a long journey ahead.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article belong solely to the author.
Comments