Today marks eight years since hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees started coming into Bangladesh, fleeing a brutal military crackdown in Myanmar's Rakhine State.
Altaf Parvez, writer and researcher on South Asian history and politics, spoke to Stream about the history of the Rohingya influx in Bangladesh, the complexities of their repatriation, and the influence of the Arakan Army, China, and India.
The following are excerpts from the exclusive interview.
Stream: International attention on the Rohingya crisis has decreased considerably. Is the issue coming back into international focus now?
Altaf Parvez: Yes, a major conference on the Rohingya issue will be held in Bangladesh very soon. Additionally, two more conferences will be organised internationally. This is positive because, due to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the Rohingya crisis had largely fallen out of view. These conferences will create opportunities for international aid and dialogue. However, this is not a solution for the immediate repatriation of the Rohingyas.
Stream: Could you briefly outline the history of the Rohingyas' arrival in Bangladesh?
Altaf Parvez: The Rohingyas primarily came from Arakan (now Rakhine State) in Burma. They were denied citizenship and ethnic recognition in Burma. Although they lived alongside the Buddhist Rakhine population in Arakan, the Burmese government did not recognise them as citizens. Due to insecurity, violence, and statelessness, they were forced to seek refuge in Bangladesh.
The history of the Rohingyas' arrival occurred in three phases. In the first phase, in 1978, around 1,80,000 Rohingyas came to Bangladesh due to a military uprising and local violence. During this time, the government of Ziaur Rahman sent many of them back.
The second wave occurred in 1992 due to new riots, primarily from northern Arakan, Mungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung areas. Since then, they have remained in Bangladesh.
The largest influx happened in 2017, which was the most horrific phase; nearly 7,00,000 Rohingyas arrived due to the Myanmar military's "clearance operations" and brutal violence. Even after that, arrivals continued, and during the current government's tenure, about 1,50,000 Rohingyas have come.
The current situation in Arakan is extremely complex. The region has 17 townships, 14 of which are now under the control of the Arakan Army. The Rohingyas' original area is primarily in northern Arakan, while the Buddhist Rakhine population is concentrated in southern Arakan. Historically, due to the 1942 riots, there has been a social distance between the Rohingya and Rakhine communities, which poses a major challenge for their repatriation."
The Rohingyas' arrival in Bangladesh is primarily the result of insecurity, violence, and statelessness. Their safe repatriation is not possible in the near future because, before that, issues such as the Arakan Army, citizenship problems, and their social distance from the Rakhine community need to be resolved.
Stream: Why is it so difficult to repatriate the Rohingya?
Altaf Parvez: For multiple reasons. First, the Rohingya are not ethnically recognised in Myanmar and they do not have citizenship. Second, their original area, Arakan, is now under the control of the Arakan Army. So, their (Arakan Army's) consent is required for repatriation.
There is another issue that many do not discuss. Historically, the social relations between the Rohingya and the Rakhine in Arakan have been very poor. This is largely a historical legacy. In 1942, there was a brutal riot there, in which Rohingya Muslims, or Muslims of Arakan, were involved in violence against the Buddhist Rakhine. It was as horrific as the riots in Kolkata or Noakhali. However, this event is less discussed in our country.
Since that riot, a social, psychological, and religious distance has developed between the Rohingya and the Rakhine, the effects of which persist today. As a result, forcibly repatriating the Rohingya people is not possible, because their relationship with those they will live alongside must first be positive. Additionally, three major issues complicate repatriation: obtaining the Arakan Army's consent, rebuilding social relations with the Rakhine community, and Myanmar's central government amending its citizenship laws and granting ethnic recognition.
Without fulfilling these conditions, repatriating the Rohingyas is almost impossible.
Stream: So, what is the path to a solution? How can the upcoming conferences help in this regard?
Altaf Parvez: Repatriating Rohingyas is complicated for many reasons. The three reasons I mentioned earlier are, of course, still valid.
The social, psychological, and religious distance makes the safe return of the Rohingyas difficult. Therefore, not only is the consent of the Arakan Army necessary, but restoring relations with the Rakhine community is also essential.
Additionally, due to the increasing number of Rohingyas, demographic pressure as well as economic and geopolitical challenges are arising in Cox's Bazar, Teknaf, and Ukhiya. If the four armed groups within the Rohingya community engage in conflict with the Arakan Army or the Myanmar military, it could also become a security problem for Bangladesh.
However, there is also a path to a solution. In the new circumstances, an understanding between the Bangladesh government and the Arakan Army is essential. The Arakan Army will want cooperation, while Bangladesh will want the safe repatriation of the Rohingyas. Additionally, an understanding with Myanmar's central government and China's cooperation is also necessary, since China has influence over Myanmar.
The upcoming conferences will bring the Rohingya crisis to international attention, which may also increase international aid. However, this is not a permanent solution for repatriating the Rohingyas. The main task remains ensuring their safe return, which is only possible through an understanding with the Arakan Army, the Rakhine community, and Myanmar's central government.
Stream: Can China play any role in resolving the Rohingya crisis?
Altaf Parvez: China has significant influence over the Myanmar government. If China engages in dialogue with Bangladesh and Myanmar's central government and pressures them to create an environment for accepting the Rohingyas, this could be implemented. In this case, Bangladesh would need to accept China as a mediator and persuade them to agree.
Moreover, China also has influence over the Arakan Army. Therefore, in resolving the Rohingya crisis, China-Bangladesh relations can act as a catalyst. Bangladesh's future government can also leverage China's role. The major challenge now is figuring out how this can be made possible.
Another point that needs to be mentioned is that Bangladesh's current role is somewhat aligned with the Western alliance led by the United States and the 'BURMA Act', which has made the entire management of the situation even more complex.
Stream: If Bangladesh manages the Rohingya refugee situation through the 'BURMA Act' and initiatives for a political solution proceed under China's diplomatic supervision, how can balance be maintained between these two processes?
Altaf Parvez: In this case, Bangladesh must maintain balance. However, it cannot be a sustainable strategy for us that the international community provides aid to the Rohingyas while Bangladesh merely offers shelter. A sustainable solution for us is the repatriation of the Rohingyas, because due to their presence, Bangladesh is unable to develop a potential relationship with Myanmar and ASEAN countries.
Therefore, we must move toward a permanent solution to the Rohingya problem. Receiving international aid and keeping the Rohingyas here to feed them cannot be a sustainable solution. Even if the United States is somewhat dissatisfied, Bangladesh should now open the door for dialogue with the Arakan Army and the Chinese government regarding the Rohingya issue. Priority should be given to repatriation rather than just figuring out how to accommodate the Rohingyas well in Bangladesh.
The old strategy that Bangladesh followed over the past six to seven years has not been effective. We were looking toward the international community—toward the United Nations and the United States. They were unable to provide us any assistance in repatriating the Rohingyas.
Stream: What is the reason for the international community's failure in resolving the Rohingya crisis?
Altaf Parvez: They lack both the capacity and the will. However, the lack of capacity is the main issue here. I do not believe that the United States can do anything in Myanmar without considering China's influence there.
Now, from 2017 to 2025, the situation in Arakan has completely changed. A new force of 30,000 troops called the Arakan Army has emerged there. As a result, it seems that the Rohingya problem cannot be resolved without dialogue with them.
Stream: In discussions on the Rohingya crisis, many personal and corporate interests are mentioned. Are these economic interests creating obstacles in political calculations?
Altaf Parvez: The Myanmar crisis has a political economy, and the Rohingya crisis has its own political economy as well. This means that it is not just political calculations at play; personal and corporate interests are also strongly involved. Various countries and organisations, directly or indirectly, are attempting to gain economic benefits, market control, and resource control centered on the Rohingya issue.
As a result, these conflicts of interest often hinder a permanent solution to the problem. It is not just politicians or the local government, but global economic and political interests that keep Myanmar's issues unresolved. In this complex context, resolving the Rohingya crisis is not possible through humanitarian or political initiatives alone. The calculations of international political economy must also be addressed.
Stream: In this context, what is India's role? How does the situation in Arakan and the Bangladesh border affect India's economic and political interests?
Altaf Parvez: Look, at this moment, Bangladesh essentially has no neighbour. Its current neighbour is Arakan. Our border with Arakan is about 250 to 300 kilometres. Through this border, billions of dollars worth of drugs are entering the country. This drug trade, along with the border, poses a major challenge for us. There is an economy around drugs. Those involved want the border to remain as it is. The Myanmar government, various parts of the country, its guerrilla groups, and some segments of the Rohingya population are also involved in the drug trade.
Additionally, this region is a major hub for arms smuggling. Recently, Myanmar enacted a law allowing investors to maintain private armies. This means China and India can keep small security forces for their investments here, further complicating the situation in Myanmar. India's largest investment in Arakan is the Kaladan project. China also has significant investments there, including gas extraction, a railway line, two pipelines, and a special economic zone in Kyaukphyu.
Therefore, China will want a political solution that protects its interests. India will also want a solution that safeguards its investments. Bangladesh will want the drug problem resolved and the Rohingyas repatriated. However, many in the international community, particularly the United States, may not want this. They may prefer instability so they can compete with China and establish their own influence in Myanmar. Some even speculate that a Christian state could emerge in parts of Myanmar and northeastern India.
As a result, some forces are active in keeping this region unstable. Therefore, Bangladesh now needs to take a well-considered position. To ensure border security, peace, and stability, we must resolve the Rohingya issue at any cost.
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