The BNP staged a walkout on the 20th day of the National Consensus Commission's dialogue yesterday, protesting the methods of appointing officials to key constitutional and oversight institutions, namely the Public Service Commission (PSC), Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), and the Office of the Ombudsman.
BNP standing committee member Salahuddin Ahmed said that the Ombudsman as well as its power and functions are already mentioned in Article 77 of the Constitution, which states: "The Ombudsman shall exercise such powers and perform such functions as Parliament may, by law, determine, including the power to investigate any action taken by a Ministry, a public officer or a statutory public authority."
Curiously, although the Ombudsman Act of 1980 was enacted by the nation's second national parliament in 1979, dominated by the BNP, neither the BNP nor any other political party-led government has implemented it.
There remain concerns about the implementation and independence of the office, especially in terms of the appointment process amid the cloud of political influence.
The BNP's dilemma expresses a broader tension between executive authority and institutional checks at a time when Bangladesh is trying to make its path to accountability and democracy.
The constitutional promise and legislative vacuum
Article 77 of the Constitution of Bangladesh provides a clear framework for the establishment of an Ombudsman. It states that Parliament "may'' create such an office by law, and the act clarifies that the Ombudsman "shall" be appointed by the president based on parliamentary recommendation.
The Ombudsman Act also lays out detailed procedural mechanisms and the scope of the office, including powers to investigate complaints about maladministration, abuse of power, and other forms of governmental misconduct.
However, the establishment of the office was not made mandatory. The Parliament has the discretion to activate it.
That leeway has resulted in decades of institutional inaction.
In a country where corruption is systemic and impunity is deeply entrenched, Article 77 also fails to include corruption or illegal accumulation of wealth within the ombudsman's investigative remit.
The BNP's past of executive control
To understand the BNP's current opposition to the Ombudsman, we must examine their record in governance, especially during their 2001–2006 term.
This was a period marked by the launch of Operation Clean Heart and the formation of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), both of which prioritised forceful state control at the expense of legal accountability.
RAB even became the primary tool of the later Awami League (AL) regime to suppress opponents, especially the BNP, with critics saying it helped Sheikh Hasina's government become a tyrannical force.
Meanwhile, Operation Clean Heart, launched in October 2002, was a military-led anti-crime initiative involving multiple law enforcement and armed forces that found itself mired in controversy.
At least 44 people died in custody under suspicious circumstances, and a "shoot on sight" order reportedly governed its operational ethos.
In 2003, the BNP government passed an indemnity ordinance, shielding those involved from prosecution, though it was struck down by the High Court in 2015 as unconstitutional.
Similarly, RAB, formed in March 2004, became infamous for extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and torture. Despite its nominal status as an elite crime-fighting unit, RAB was used by successive AL regimes as a blunt instrument of control.
During BNP's tenure, over 1,000 people were killed in operations conducted by RAB between 2004 and 2008.
The unit's immunity provisions and the lack of an independent Ombudsman meant these abuses went unchallenged by any oversight mechanism.
From opposition to oversight
After the fall of the AL regime through the July uprising in 2024, the BNP feels poised to return to power.
In discussions with the NCC earlier this year, BNP leaders made it clear that they are opposed to activating the Ombudsman's office.
Party leaders, such as Salahuddin Ahmed, argue that institutional oversight mechanisms like the Ombudsman curtailing the executive branch's power may disrupt governance.
But this stance stands in direct contradiction to the party's previous statements.
In their 2022 reform blueprint, released while under intense pressure from the AL regime, the BNP explicitly supported the formation of an Ombudsman as a means to address state abuses and promote accountability.
At that time, it served as a political tool to differentiate themselves from an increasingly autocratic regime. Now, with the feeling that they are on the cusp of power, they view the same mechanism as a threat.
Reform in good faith
As Bangladesh enters a new political era, the BNP must make a choice.
Will it be governed by the playbook of the past, or will it embrace institutional accountability as a pillar of democratic restoration?
The newly proposed Ombudsman's office represents more than a bureaucratic formality.
In democracies like Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, as well as neighbouring India and Pakistan, the Ombudsman plays a crucial role in addressing citizen's grievances and curbing state excesses.
Bangladesh, a country with significant governance challenges, needs a legislative and an executive Ombudsman to meet these demands.
The BNP's refusal to act on this front may limit their international legitimacy and erode public confidence. If the BNP truly seeks to distinguish itself from the excesses of the past two decades, institutional reform, starting with the Ombudsman, must be more than a rhetorical device.
The BNP's dilemma is not just about an office. It's about the future direction of Bangladeshi governance and whether it will be shaped by opaque command or by democratic accountability.
The choice they make in 2025 could define their legacy for decades to come.
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