On 15 August 1975, the assassination of Bangladesh's then president Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, along with most of his family, marked a turning point in the country's political history, shifting from one-party rule to a new political landscape.
The US Embassy in Dhaka remarked on this power shift, through a military coup, as a "successful and unchallenged" transformation of power.
This assessment was documented in a secret telegram sent by then-US ambassador to Bangladesh, Davis E Boster (Davis Eugene Boster). The US government made these telegrams public a few years ago.
In a series of telegrams sent between 15 and 20 August, particularly those dated 15 and 16 August, Ambassador Boster outlined the situation in Dhaka and Bangladesh during that time. According to his message, Dhaka remained calm, with no significant resistance observed. All branches of the armed forces, the army, navy, air force, and police, had expressed their allegiance to the country's new president.
In the initial commentary of the telegram, Boster stated that the general public had accepted Sheikh Mujib's downfall calmly, and even that there was a sense of relief. He wrote that Mujib's tendency toward individualistic power, familial domination, and one-party politics had gradually distanced the people from him.
Alongside these observations on Sheikh Mujib's assassination, the telegrams also contained comments and assessments about the character and challenges of the government of Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad, which was formed mostly by Awami League parliament members. The ambassador had also warned about the possibility of a civil war.
Regarding India's role
Boster observed that although the new government held an anti-India stance, it did not want to increase suspicion from its neighbouring country; rather, it would try to demonstrate 'steadfast continuity' toward India. Boster wrote that despite the new government's anti-India attitude, it did not want to provoke suspicion or concern in neighbouring India; in other words, the government aimed to reduce, not escalate, tensions with India.
Boster also mentioned in the telegram that the new government intended to reduce Russian (Soviet) influence and build balanced relations with the United States and China. In another telegram dated 20 August, he clarified that there was no evidence of 'India's involvement' in the events of the previous week. A strong anti-India sentiment had developed in Dhaka.
Meanwhile, a telegram from the US Embassy in Delhi reported that although left-wing leaders in India openly accused the CIA of involvement in the coup, the Indian government did not officially blame the United States. However, Washington internally considered this accusation to be baseless.
Character and challenges of the new government
Boster described the post-15 August government in his telegram, noting that although Mostaq's cabinet included familiar figures, its chances of gaining popularity were low. He further commented that close associates of Mujib (either deceased or expelled) had been excluded from this government. Still, it was composed of many familiar figures who were in some way connected to the previous misrule.
Regarding the planning of the coup, the telegram reveals that only a few individuals were involved. Consequently, there was no well-defined action plan after the seizure of power. In this context, Boster warned that without firm action, the government's initial advantageous position could disappear quickly. If political disorder arose, the military might intervene again.
According to Boster, the new government might be more cordial toward the United States than in past, as the left-leaning leaders of the Mujib government (such as Tajuddin Ahmad and Abdus Samad Azad) were no longer in power. Regarding Khondaker Mostaq, Boster observed that he had previously praised the United States. He believed that the US was capable of providing the most effective assistance to Bangladesh. However, Boster also noted that this expectation of assistance could pose challenges for American diplomacy.
The risk of civil war and regional challenges
In his telegram dated August 20, Boster warned that a civil war could create the possibility of Indian military intervention. Therefore, the new government's primary political goal should be to avoid internal conflict and establish stability quickly.
From the disclosed telegrams, it is clear that the United States' initial assessment was that the August 15, 1975 coup was swift and effortless. The new government was not expected to worsen relations with India but rather to try to bring balance in international diplomacy. At the same time, the telegrams also suggested that there could be an opportunity for closer ties with the United States, as expressed by the then-US Ambassador.
Summary of important telegrams from the US Embassy in Dhaka (August 15–20, 1975):
August 15, 1975
Telegram: COUP IN BANGLADESH: SITUATION REPORT
From: Ambassador Davis E. Boster (Dhaka)
- A coup took place at dawn; President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was killed.
- The army, navy, air force, and police- all forces have pledged allegiance to the coup leaders.
- Announcement of the new president: Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad.
- Dhaka remains calm, with no significant resistance observed.
- Account of the event: This is practically a successful military coup, with the new leadership seeking to establish itself in power.
- India's reaction is still unknown, though it may view the incident as an "internal matter" of Bangladesh.
August 16, 1975
Cable: PRELIMINARY COMMENT ON THE COUP IN BANGLADESH
From: Ambassador Davis E. Boster (Dhaka)
- The new government will not seek to damage relations with India, but it will not remain as pro-Indian as in the past.
- Its diplomatic goal will be not to increase India's suspicions or concerns.
- There may be an effort to reduce Soviet influence somewhat and establish a balance.
- Possibility of closer relations with the United States.
- No indication that India was directly involved in the coup.
August 20, 1975
Telegram: SITUATION UPDATE & INDIAN REACTION CONCERNS
From: Ambassador Davis E. Boster (Dhaka)
- Avoiding the threat of a civil war is the main political goal now, because a civil war could create the possibility of Indian military intervention.
- There is no evidence that India was involved in last week's events.
- A strong anti-India sentiment is evident across the country.
- The new government is seeking stability, but both internal and regional challenges are significant.
The backdrop of the assassination
Political background: After the liberation war, Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the principal architect of the state formation. He was the most powerful political leader at that time as well. In this reality, the establishment of a one-party system called BAKSAL and the decision to control newspapers early in 1975 appeared to many as a departure from democratic values. With opposition political forces effectively neutralised or suppressed, the balance of power was severely disrupted. Simultaneously, the space for criticism was curtailed. According to analysts, dissatisfaction grew not only among opposition groups but also within certain factions of the ruling power.
Extrajudicial Killing: In independent Bangladesh, the first victim of extrajudicial killing at the hands of the government formed under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was Siraj Sikder, a freedom fighter and chief of the Sarbahara Party. On August 1, 1975, he was arrested from Savar, and the following day, August 2, this revolutionary leader was killed. South Asia affairs journalist Anthony Mascarenhas wrote in his book "Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood" that Siraj Sikder's sister, Shamim Sikder, blamed Sheikh Mujib for her brother's killing. It wasn't just Siraj Sikder; during Mujib's rule, many dissenters, including members of JASOD, were killed at the hands of the paramilitary force Rakkhi Bahini formed by him, creating silent resentment among the public.
Economic and social situation: As per statistics, one million people died in the devastating famine of 1974. Adding to this crisis, corruption in the relief distribution system dealt a severe blow to the government's public support. Problems such as food shortages, inflation, unemployment, and black market activities not only eroded the hopes and trust of the people just three years after Bangladesh's independence but also tarnished the image of the leader whom people had revered during the liberation war. Although there was success in rebuilding the war-ravaged economy, development was slow compared to public expectations. There was no visible progress. According to economists, these factors primarily made the economic and social situation intolerable at that time.
Administrative and security crisis: After 1971, the process of establishing a unified structure and discipline among the military and freedom fighter groups was complicated. Some freedom fighters and military officers were dissatisfied with the government's policies and methods. Resentment among army members increased, especially after the formation of a special militia called the 'Rakkhi Bahini.' At the same time, allegations of corruption and favouritism against Sheikh Mujib's government also damaged its administrative credibility.
Self-centred leadership: Though Sheikh Mujib was popular during the liberation war, after forming the government in an independent country, his popularity gradually collapsed. His emergence as an autocrat within a personalised leadership structure was at its root. Political and administrative decisions were highly centralised, and the influence of his family also played a significant role in this regard; several political analysts pointed this out in their writings.
International and regional influences: Since the liberation war, Bangladesh had close alliances with two key allies, India and the Soviet Union (Russia). As a result, many believed that this alliance placed Bangladesh in a one-sided diplomatic position. During the post-1971 cold war period, Sheikh Mujib's government had comparatively weak relations with the United States, China, and many Middle Eastern countries. This lack of balance in regional geopolitics attracted international support for internal dissent.
Immediate reason: The coup was planned by a small faction within the military, which capitalised on the prevailing discontent and political instability at that time. The plotters of the coup believed that the fall of Sheikh Mujib's government would not face strong resistance. And it actually proved to be true. Due to the lack of immediate opposition from the top military leadership and the civilian administration, the coup was swiftly successful.
The downfall of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the result of a multifaceted crisis. On one hand, there was a loss of popular support, administrative weaknesses, and military dissatisfaction; on the other hand, excessive centralisation of power and a lack of regional and international diplomatic balance. Altogether, this brutal and tragic assassination was not merely a military coup by a few soldiers; rather, it was an explosion of unresolved discontent that had been building up across various levels of the state, society, and politics.
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